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I. INTRODUCTION
During the height of the 2016 presidential campaign, a sleeping giant was
jostled awake.1 It began with bloodshed on the evening of July 1, 2015.2 While
visiting a famous fishing pier in San Francisco with her family, 32-year-old
Kathryn Steinle was shot and killed.3 Her alleged assailant, Juan Francisco
Lopez-Sanchez, was an undocumented immigrant with seven felony convictions
and whom the government had deported five times.4 Earlier that year, police had
brought Lopez-Sanchez into custody on a twenty-year old drug warrant.5 While
1. Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 159, 162 (2016); see also Seema Mehta, San Francisco Slaying Upends Immigration Debate in
2016 Presidential Race, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-politics-immigration20150724-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the murder of Kathryn
Steinle as “scrambl[ing] the political equation overnight”).
2. Mehta, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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there, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) requested that he
remain in police custody until they could pick him up.6 Despite this request, the
San Francisco District Attorney dismissed Lopez-Sanchez’s drug charges and the
Sheriff’s Department released him.7 The Sheriff’s Department released him
because of a San Francisco city ordinance that prevents local law enforcement
from detaining a person on behalf of ICE after the person becomes eligible for
release unless the person is a violent felon.8 Steinle’s story reignited a
longstanding political dialogue about reforming the United States immigration
system.9
In the 1980s, churches sheltered Central American refugees who immigrated
to America illegally in an attempt to escape persecution and violent civil wars in
their home countries.10 Hence, the term “sanctuary city” was born.11 While there
is no legal definition for a “sanctuary” jurisdiction, the term is most often used to
describe localities that “place limits on their assistance to federal immigration
authorities seeking to apprehend and remove unauthorized aliens.”12 The federal
government has increasingly relied on state and local law enforcement agencies
(LEAs) to enforce federal immigration laws.13 Cities across the country
responded to this reliance with sanctuary policies.14 Chapter 495 is California’s
attempt to distance itself from the business of enforcing federal immigration
laws.15
6. Id.; What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.ice.gov/overview (last visited June 1, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(ICE is a federal law enforcement agency under DHS whose “mission is to protect America from the crossborder crime and illegal immigration that threaten national security and public safety.”).
7. Mehta, supra note 1.
8. Id.; S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 12I, § 12I.3 (Oct. 8, 2013), available at https://sfgov.org/
oceia/sites/default/files/Documents/SF%20Admin %20Code%2012H-12I.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
9. Maxwell Tani, The Chilling Murder of a San Francisco Woman Has Roiled the Immigration Debate,
BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/kathryn-steinle-murder-immigration-sanctuarycities-2015-7 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1197, 1199 (2016).
11. Id.
12. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., “SANCTUARY CITIES”: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (Jan. 15,
2009), available at https://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0106-crs.pdf (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
13. Alia Al-Khatib, Putting a Hold on ICE: Why Law Enforcement Should Refuse to Honor Immigration
Detainers, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 109, 118 (2014).
14. See Dean Kuipers, Fire and ICE: Beyond Sanctuary, CAP. & MAIN (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://capitalandmain.com/fire-and-ice-beyond-sanctuary-0426 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (discussing the sanctuary movement in California); see also Clyde Haberman, Trump and the Battle
Over Sanctuary in America, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/05/ us/sanctuarycities-movement-1980s-political-asylum.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining the origins and recent evolution of the sanctuary movement throughout America).
15. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant the federal government
the power to regulate immigration, the federal government has nonetheless
traditionally exercised that power.16 The United States Supreme Court has
“anchored this authority” in several clauses in the Constitution: the
Naturalization Clause, Commerce Clause, War Clause, and Migration and
Importation Clause.17 The Court reiterated that the “[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”18 Despite the federal
government’s dominion over immigration in America, in recent years, state and
local LEAs have become increasingly involved in immigration enforcement.19
This shift is largely due to changes in federal and state law, and strengthened
efforts of federal immigration agencies to solicit and incentivize state and local
aid.20 These developments have exposed a deep, foundational divide across the
United States, with some states choosing to react by passing sanctuary laws and
others vehemently desiring to collaborate with the federal government in curbing
illegal immigration.21 There is no consensus on the number of United States

16. APPLESEED, FORCING OUR BLUES INTO GRAY AREAS: LOCAL POLICE AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT 7 (2008), available at http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/
id/1603 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Steven Papazian, Secure Communities,
Sanctuary Laws, and Local Enforcement of Immigration Law: The Story of Los Angeles, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. &
SOC. JUST. 283, 287 (2012).
17. Papazian, supra note 16, at 287–88; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (the Naturalization Clause provides
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization”); Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the
Commerce Clause provides “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the War Clause provides
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War”); Id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (the Migration and Importation
Clause provides “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight,
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person”).
18. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
19. Armacost, supra note 10, at 1206.
20. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the New Cooperative
Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 88 (2016). The enactment of the Immigrant Reform and
Responsibility Act of 1996 and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
were central to and responsible for increasing state and local participation in immigration law. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373) (limiting state and local restrictions on communications with
federal immigration authorities); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105, 2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644) (setting further limits on
restricting communication regarding immigration status between local and state agencies and federal
immigration authorities); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563–64 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)) (creating the 287(g)
program, which allows federal immigration authorities to deputize local and state LEAs to perform the
functions of immigration officers).
21. GARCIA, supra note 12, at 1; see also Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Kartikay Mehrotra, Battle over
Sanctuary Cities Pits California Against Texas, BLOOMBERG POL. (June 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.
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sanctuary cities.22 This is likely because the term lacks a uniform definition.23 In
California, however, unofficial reports suggest there are currently 18 cities and
counties with sanctuary policies in effect.24
Section A discusses how federal lawmakers and immigration agencies have
taken a joint approach to immigration enforcement.25 Section B explains how
California law regulates state and local law enforcement participation in
immigration enforcement.26 Section C reviews the constitutional framework and
issues surrounding sanctuary policies.27 Section D describes the social and
political context surrounding sanctuary jurisdictions in the United States.28
A. Federal Legislation: A Collaborative Approach
In the mid-1990s, state and local authorities started becoming more active
participants in federal immigration enforcement.29 The need for federal
immigration authorities to harness a wider pool of resources and manpower
inspired this change.30 Subsection 1 discusses the open-door policy required
under federal law and explains the program authorizing LEAs to perform the
functions of an immigration officer.31 Subsection 2 describes the informationsharing network between federal criminal and immigration agencies during the

com/news/articles/2017-06-20/battle-over-sanctuary-cities-pits-california-against-texas (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the countervailing stances taken by California and Texas).
22. See Jasmine C. Lee et al., What Are Sanctuary Cities? N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (reporting that there are at least 633 counties with sanctuary policies in place throughout
the US); see also Stephen Dinan, Number of Sanctuary Cities Nears 500, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/14/number-sanctuary-cities-nears-500-report/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that there are nearly 500 sanctuary cities in America as of
March 2017).
23. See GARCIA, supra note 12, at 1 (noting the lack of a federal definition of the term sanctuary city, but
describing the term’s usage).
24. Sandy Coronilla, List of ‘Sanctuary’ Cities 2017, ABC 10 NEWS, KGTV SAN DIEGO (Apr. 25, 2017),
http://www.10news.com/news/list-of-sanctuary-cities-2017 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
25. Infra Part II.A.
26. Infra Part II.B.
27. Infra Part II.C.
28. Infra Part II.D.
29. APPLESEED, supra note 16, at 17.
30. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to
Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 183 (2005) (“[S]tate and local officers are the eyes and ears of
law enforcement across the United States . . . Federal immigration officers simply cannot cover the same
ground.”).
31. Infra Part II.A.1.
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booking process into state prisons.32 Subsection 3 elaborates on the primary
mechanism ICE uses to seek the help of local and state law enforcement.33
1. Unrestricted Information Sharing Between State and Local Law
Enforcement and Federal Immigration Authorities and the 287(g)
Program
In 1996, amidst a “flurry of activity on immigration reform,” Congress
passed two laws that gave state and local agencies the authority and discretion to
cooperate and share information with federal immigration authorities: the Illegal
Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).34
Together, IIRIRA section 642 and PRWORA section 434 provide that local,
state, and federal entities or officials may not restrict or prohibit their employees
from communicating with federal immigration agencies about a person’s
immigration status.35 Congress passed both laws primarily in response to a
growing sanctuary movement throughout America.36 While neither of these
provisions require a state or local agency to cooperate with federal immigration
authorities, both create and expressly require an open channel between federal
and state officials on this issue.37
Further, IIRIRA created the “287(g) program,” which allows the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and states, cities, or localities to enter into
agreements whereby local and state police forces are “deputized . . . to perform
certain immigration monitoring and enforcement functions.”38 The 287(g)
program permits local and state police forces to perform nearly the same
functions as a federal immigration officer, which includes “investigat[ing],

32. Infra Part II.A.2.
33. Infra Part II.A.3.
34. APPLESEED, supra note 16, at 17; Amdur, supra note 20, at 98–99 (IIRIRA “expanded the convictionbased grounds for deportation, enlarged the definition of aggravated felonies, and cut off some avenues for
deportation relief” and also “introduced a system of mandatory detention, . . . new procedures . . . to accelerate
formal deportations . . . and new approaches to securing local participants.”); KEVIN JOHNSON ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 82–83 (2d ed., 2015) (enacted by President Clinton, PRWORA was a
social welfare law that restricted legal immigrants’ ability to access federally-funded public benefits).
35. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West 2017); Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 434, 110 Stat. 2105,
2275 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644); 8 U.S.C.A § 1644 (West 2017).
36. Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration
Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 169 (2016).
37. Id.
38. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133,
110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009-573–64 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g)); APPLESEED, supra note 16, at 7.
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apprehen[ding], or det[aining] aliens in the United States.”39 Currently, 60 LEAs
in 18 states have active 287(g) agreements.40
2. Information Sharing Under the Secure Communities Program
In 2008, the George W. Bush administration introduced the Secure
Communities program (S-Comm).41 S-Comm is an “information–sharing
partnership between DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI].”42
When an officer books a person into a prison, electronic fingerprint records are
created.43 Officers send those records to the FBI and DHS, and if the inmate is
deemed a priority for deportation, DHS relays their information to ICE.44 From
there, ICE initiates an enforcement action, which generally takes the form of an
immigration detainer notice wherein ICE requests that the agency with custody
either detain the person or notify ICE before releasing them.45 In 2014, Secretary
of DHS, Jeh Charles Johnson, discontinued S-Comm in response to an onslaught
of criticism and outrage from politicians and law enforcement officials around
the country.46 On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump reactivated the
program.47
3. ICE Immigration Detainers to State and Local Law Enforcement
Under existing federal law, any authorized immigration officer has the
authority to issue a detainer to any federal, state, or local LEA if there is probable

39. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g) (West 2006).
40. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g
(last visited Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Fact Sheet for 287(g) Program] (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (LEAs in the following states have current 287(g) agreements with ICE: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California (Orange County Sheriff’s Office), Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia).
41. Armacost, supra note 10, at 1208.
42. Secure Communities FAQ, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited June 1, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Jazmine Ulloa, What You Need to Know About California’s ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill and How It
Would Work, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-sanctuary-state-billexplained-20170413-htmlstory.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
46. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t. 1–2 (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
47. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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cause that “the subject is a removable alien.”48 A detainer is a notification that
authorized immigration officers send to state or local agencies to inform them
that DHS intends to assume custody of someone in their possession and requests
the agency notify them before releasing that person from detention.49 It also
requests the LEA “maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released
for a period not to exceed 48 hours.”50 Because it is merely a request and
compliance is voluntary, LEAs have discretion to choose whether or not to
comply.51
B. California Legislation: A Shift Away from Collaboration
In recent years, California cities and counties have distanced themselves
from the collaborative approach reflected in federal legislation.52 Across the
state, an increasing number of cities have enacted sanctuary policies, such as Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland.53 Taken as a whole, these sanctuary
policies reflect a common desire to limit information sharing and communication
between federal immigration authorities and state and local LEAs.54
In California, existing law requires an arresting agency to notify federal
immigration authorities when it has reason to believe a person arrested on drugrelated charges might not be a citizen of the United States.55 Further, in October
2013, “Governor Jerry Brown signed the Transparency and Responsibility Using
State Tools (TRUST) Act.”56 Assembly Member Ammiano introduced the
TRUST Act in response to the S-Comm program’s attempt to “set a minimum
standard for elective compliance with ICE detainer requests to protect detainees

48. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2017); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION DETAINER – NOTICE OF
ACTION 1 (2017), available at https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-247A.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Probable cause exists where there is a “‘reasonable
ground for belief of guilt,’ and . . . the belief of guilt [is] particularized with respect to the person searched or
seized.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brineger v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175
(1949)).
49. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2017).
50. Id. § 287.7(d).
51. Id. § 287.7(a).
52. Kuipers, supra note 14; see supra Part II.A (discussing the collaborative approach followed in federal
legislation).
53. Kuipers, supra note 14.
54. Id.
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11369 (repealed by Chapter 495) (the offenses under this section
included, for example, unlawful possession of various controlled substances, operating a place for drug
trafficking, possession of marijuana for sale, and transportation and sale of marijuana to a minor).
56. Ulloa, supra note 45; Immigration Law – Criminal Justice and Immigration Enforcement–California
Limits Local Entities’ Compliance with Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainer Requests, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2593 (2014) [hereinafter Criminal Justice and Immigration Enforcement].
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from being held after they are eligible for release.”57 The TRUST Act added
California Government Code sections 7282 and 7282.5, which provide the
targeted person must have been convicted of an enumerated crime in order for
local law enforcement officials to enforce a detainer and hold a person sought by
ICE.58 Existing law also sets ICE cooperation guidelines by requiring the local
agency, before any interview between ICE and a person in local custody, to
provide the person with a “form that explains the purpose of the interview, that
the interview is voluntary, and that he or she may decline to be interviewed.”59
C. Constitutional Issues
Refusing to offer state and local resources for the enforcement of federal
immigration laws, as many sanctuary policies do, raises serious constitutional
concerns.60 Subsection 1 discusses the doctrine of preemption as a primary
constitutional challenge facing sanctuary policies, and Subsection 2 elaborates on
the anti-commandeering doctrine as well as state police power as a counter to
potential concerns of preemption.61
1. Federal Preemption of State Laws
Under the preemption doctrine, “state and local governments are deprived of
their power to act in a given area, whether or not the state or local law, rule or
action is in direct conflict with federal law.”62 The doctrine is rooted in the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which states the “Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”63 Most
often, preemption issues arise when a “sub-federal entity legislates in … area[s]
… traditionally reserved to the federal government.”64 The federal government’s
exclusive immigration authority is rooted in the Constitution and judicial
precedent.65

57. Carrie Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-federal
Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481, 484, 486 (2015).
58. 2013 Cal. Stat. 570 (enacting CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282–7282.5) (West 2017). These offenses
include, among other things, obstruction of justice, gang-related crimes, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape,
carjacking, and robbery. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282.5(a) (West 2017).
59. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7283.1(a) (West 2017).
60. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing
and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 250 (2012).
61. Infra Part II.C.1–2.
62. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION, REGULATION,
AND LITIGATION 1 (2006).
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. Rosenbaum, supra note 57, at 486.
65. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably
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There are two forms of sanctuary laws relevant to preemption challenges:
don’t-ask and don’t-tell.66 Jurisdictions with don’t-ask laws “prohibit government
employees from inquiring about the immigration status of an individual,” while
those with don’t tell laws “prohibit government employees from disclosing or
communicating an individual’s immigration information to the federal
government.”67 City of New York v. United States and Sturgeon v. Bratton are
particularly relevant to whether sanctuary policies are preempted because they
reveal a crucial distinction between don’t ask and don’t tell policies.68 City of
New York involved a policy that “prohibit[ed] City officials from sharing with
federal authorities information about the immigration status of aliens”; in other
words, a don’t tell policy.69 The court found that federal law preempted local
policy.70 Sturgeon, on the other hand, involved an Los Angeles Police
Department policy that “prohibited officers from engaging with members of the
community for the sole purpose of uncovering civil immigration violations”—in
other words, a don’t ask policy.71 There, the court concluded that the don’t-ask
policy was not in “total and fatal conflict” with federal law and was therefore not
preempted.72
Express preemption “requires a clear statement from Congress of its intent to
preempt a particular sort of state law.”73 Field preemption is a form of implied
preemption that “requires an inquiry into whether the federal government has
occupied the field such that there is no room for the exercise of state authority.”74
Finally, conflict preemption exists where it is impossible to comply with both
federal and state laws and where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”75

exclusively a federal power.”); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012) (“The Government of the
United States has broad, undoubted power over . . . immigration and the status of aliens. This authority rests, in
part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ . . . and
its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations.”).
66. Papazian, supra note 16, at 290–91.
67. Id.
68. See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 732–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that federal law
did not preempt the sanctuary policy at issue); see also City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789,
797 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that federal law did preempt the sanctuary policy at issue); Hing, supra note 61, at
263–273.
69. City of New York, 971 F. Supp. at 791.
70. McCormick, supra note 36, at 188.
71. Id. at 196–97; Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 718.
72. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 731–33.
73. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Muzaffar Chishti & Kimberly Nortman, Legal Limits on Immigration
Federalism, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 31, 34
(Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010).
74. Id.
75. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
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2. Police Power and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court reiterated that federal law
should not supersede the “historic police powers of the States” absent a clear,
contrary intention by Congress.76 A state’s police power includes “the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of
all property within the state.”77
The Tenth Amendment embodies the anti-commandeering doctrine, which
provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”78 As interpreted by the courts, the anticommandeering doctrine prohibits the federal government from forcing states or
localities to regulate a specific issue.79 It rests upon our system of dual
sovereignty, where national and state governments each possess their own share
of sovereignty that must respect the other.80 Under this system, it is
unconstitutional for a federal law to intrude into an area of state sovereignty (and
vice versa).81
D. Social and Political Context
The Trump administration’s harsh rhetoric concerning its plans for dealing
with illegal immigrants has brought immigration to the forefront of American
politics.82 Throughout Donald Trump’s campaign, “aggressive denunciations of

(1941)).
76. Id. at 400.
77. John Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1855). As interpreted by various
legislatures, a state’s police powers include ensuring access to public education and arresting individuals for
engaging in criminal activity. Yule Kim, The Limits of State and Local Immigration Enforcement and
Regulation, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 242, 248 (2010); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1400 (2006).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
79. Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual Defiance of Federal
Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 141 (2014); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”).
80. Cimini, supra note 79, at 139.
81. Hing, supra note 60, at 273; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (explaining that “if
a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress”).
82. See Cody Derespina, Trump: Illegal Immigrant Criminals Are ‘Getting the Hell Out,’ FOX NEWS
(Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/18/trump-illegal-immigrant-criminals-are-gettinghell-out.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the impact of Trump’s
immigration policies in America); see also Lawrence Hurley, Trump Travel Ban Fight Heads Toward Supreme
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illegal immigrants” were commonplace.83 Largely catalyzed by the death of
Kathryn Steinle at the hands of an illegal immigrant in 2015, this “sentiment
segued into an attack on ‘sanctuary cities.’”84 In response to the growing
sanctuary movement throughout America, the Trump administration continues to
reiterate its belief that sanctuary jurisdictions violate federal law and, therefore,
should not receive federal funding.85 On January 25, 2017, President Trump
vowed to make good on the administration’s prior threats by issuing Executive
Order 13768.86 The order requires the Attorney General and Secretary to “ensure
that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (sanctuary
jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed
necessary for law enforcement purposes.”87 To date, both President Trump and
Attorney General Jeff Sessions have repeatedly reiterated their plan to block
federal funding for sanctuary jurisdictions.88 Thus far, however, the
administration has not yet followed through with those threats.89
While some cities and states have scaled back their sanctuary policies in
response to the order, others have leveraged the conflict as “providing a platform
for challenging the . . . administration” and increasing the urgency of protecting
their immigrant communities.90 In California specifically, “the nationwide wave
of resistance to President Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant executive orders has

Court Showdown, REUTERS (May 27, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-courtidUSKBN18M2C7 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting the Supreme Court will
hear the case regarding the federal court’s blocking of Trump’s travel ban); Kirk Semple, Central Americans,
‘Scared of What’s Happening’ in U.S., Stay Put, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/03/world/americas/honduras-migration-border-wall.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (explaining that Trump’s immigration policies have already led to fewer Central American
migrants).
83. Christopher Dunn, The Constitutional Wall Between Trump and Sanctuary Cities; Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties, N.Y. L. J., May 31, 2017 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
84. Id.
85. Octavio Blanco, Becoming a Sanctuary State Could Help California Protect Its Economy, Too, CNN
MONEY (May 18, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/18/news/economy/sanctuary-state-californiaundocumented/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. Tal Kopan, On Immigration, Trump Has Plenty to Show in 100 Days, CNN POL. (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/politics/trump-100-days-immigration/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Priscilla Alvarez, Trump
Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/01/trump-crack-down-sanctuary-city/514427/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
88. Blanco, supra note 85.
89. See County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081, at *29
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (issuing a nationwide injunction against enforcing section 9(a) of the order
threatening to rescind federal funding to sanctuary jurisdictions).
90. Dunn, supra note 83; Andy J. Semotiuk, Dispute Over Illegal Immigrants Threatens Federal Funding
for Sanctuary Cities, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2017/04/18/disputeover-illegal-immigrants-threatens-federal-funding-for-sanctuary-cities/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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become a tsunami.”91 One way the President’s immigration policy has been
challenged is through litigation.92 Just days after President Trump issued the
executive order, San Francisco County, the City of San Francisco, and Santa
Clara County challenged its constitutionality in the courts.93 On April 25, 2017, a
district court judge ordered a nationwide injunction against the enforcement of
the order’s vow to withdraw funding from sanctuary jurisdictions.94 Across the
country, politicians, lawmakers, and civilians continue to challenge the
President’s immigration policy in the courts, in the legislature, and on the
streets.95
III. CHAPTER 495
Chapter 495 is a targeted response to the overlap between federal
immigration enforcement and state and local agencies.96 Taken as a whole, it
“seeks to ensure effective policing, to protect the safety, well-being, and
constitutional rights of California citizens, and to direct the state’s limited
resources to matters of greatest concern to state and local governments.”97
Section A explains Chapter 495’s ban on using state and local agency resources
for immigration enforcement purposes.98 Section B clarifies the exceptions to
Chapter 495’s limitations on state and local cooperation and describes Chapter
495’s creation of “safe zones.”99
A. Chapter 495 Forbids Local and State Law Enforcement Agencies from Using
State Resources for Immigration Enforcement Purposes
Chapter 495 prohibits California LEAs from using agency resources,
including “moneys or personnel [to] investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or
arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.”100 State and local LEAs
91. Kuipers, supra note 14.
92. See Katy Steinmetz, California Lawyers Say President Trump’s Sanctuary City Order Is a ‘Gun to
Your Head,’ TIME (Apr. 14, 2017), http://time.com/4740823/donald-trump-sanctuary-city-california-sanfrancisco-santa-clara/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the recent lawsuits
filed by San Francisco and Santa Clara County against Trump).
93. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 33–41, County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump,
No. 5:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21–22, City
and County of San Francisco v. Donald Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
94. County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081, at *29 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 25, 2017).
95. Kuipers, supra note 14.
96. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2017).
97. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2(f) (enacted by Chapter 495).
98. Infra Part III.A.
99. Infra Part III.B.
100. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a) (enacted by Chapter 495).
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may not: (1) inquire into a person’s immigration status; (2) detain a person based
on an ICE hold request; (3) provide release dates; (4) provide personal
information about a person not publicly available; (5) arrest persons based on
civil immigration warrants; (6) help or collaborate with federal immigration
authorities under 8 U.S.C. § 1357; or (7) perform the functions of an immigration
officer.101
Chapter 495 prohibits California LEAs from transferring a person in their
custody to ICE without a judicial probable cause determination or judicial
warrant.102 LEAs are also prohibited from “contract[ing] with the federal
government for use of … [LEA] facilities to house individuals as federal
detainees” and may not dedicate office space to ICE within state or local law
enforcement facilities.103
B. Chapter 495 Carves out Exceptions Relating to Criminal Activity, Creates
“Safe Zones” for Immigrant Communities, and Repeals Section 11369 of the
Health and Safety Code
Chapter 495 does not bar collaboration in all circumstances and creates
several exceptions to its ban against using agency resources for immigration
enforcement.104 One exception is when an LEA detects, during an unrelated
police activity, an undocumented immigrant who had previously been deported
after an aggravated felony conviction.105 California LEAs are also free to respond
to requests about a person’s criminal history.106 These exceptions give LEAs
leeway for collaboration regarding violent criminals.107 Further, Chapter 495
creates “safe zones” by requiring that all public schools, public libraries, stateoperated health facilities, courthouses, and shelters adopt policies limiting
collaboration with immigration enforcement “to the fullest extent possible.”108 By
101. Id. § 7284.6(a)(1); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (West 2017) (setting a framework for the powers of
immigration officers and employees, including, for example, guidelines for conduct without a warrant,
detaining aliens for violation of controlled substances laws, and for protecting abused juveniles).
102. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 495); Id. § 7284.4(h) (“Judicial probable
cause determination” means a “determination made by a federal judge or federal magistrate judge that probable
cause exists that an individual has violated federal criminal immigration law and that authorizes a law
enforcement officer to arrest and take into custody that individual.”); Id. § 7284.4(i) (a judicial warrant is a
warrant issued by a federal judge or federal magistrate judge and must be based on “probable cause for a
violation of federal criminal immigration law.”).
103. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(5)–(6) (enacted by Chapter 495).
104. See id. § 7284.6(b)(1)–(5) (listing activities that Chapter 495 does not prevent LEAs from engaging
in); Id. § 7284.6(e) (providing that LEAs are still permitted to comply with federal law codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1373, 1644).
105. Id. § 7284.4(b)(1).
106. Id. § 7284.6(b)(2).
107. Id. § 7284.6(a)(1).
108. Id. § 7284.8(a). While the language of Chapter 495 does not refer to the creation of “safe zones,” the
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creating these “safe zones,” Chapter 495 guarantees immigrants the ability to
access these vital services without fearing deportation.109 Chapter 495 also
repeals Health and Safety Code section 11369, which required the arresting
agency to notify ICE if it had reason to believe a person arrested for various
enumerated controlled substance offenses was not a citizen of the United
States.110
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 495, which the Washington Post has referred to as the “highestprofile act of defiance to Trump’s nascent presidency,” is indicative of the many
ways in which opposition parties have declared war against Trump’s immigration
policies.111 Also known as the California Values Act, legislators introduced
Chapter 495 in an attempt to build a “wall of justice” that would “protect the
safety, well-being, and constitutional rights of the people of California, and . . .
direct the state’s limited resources to matters of greatest concern to state and
local governments.”112
Section A discusses whether strengthening the relationship between
immigrant communities and local law enforcement will be enough to achieve
Chapter 495’s lofty aspirations.113 Section B addresses how Chapter 495 helps
shift local and state resources away from immigration enforcement and towards
protecting our communities.114 Section C evaluates the challenges preemption
may present to Chapter 495.115 Section D analyzes the extent to which Chapter
495 aligns with state sovereignty and Tenth Amendment concerns.116 Section E
elaborates on Chapter 495’s fiscal impact in light of federal threats to withhold
funding from sanctuary jurisdictions.117

media has adopted that term to refer to these provisions. Ulloa, supra note 46.
109. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.8(a) (enacted by Chapter 495).
110. SB 54, 2017 Leg., 2016–2017 Sess., § 4 (Cal. 2017); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11369
(repealed by Chapter 495).
111. Amber Phillips, California Is in a War with Trump on ‘Sanctuary Cities.’ It Just Won Its First Major
Battle, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/25/californiais-in-a-war-with-trump-on-sanctuary-cities-and-it-just-won-its-first-major-battle/?utm_term=.cdd88c92c792 (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284, 7284.2(f) (enacted by Chapter 495); Alexei Koseff, California Bill
Creates Deportation 'Safe Zones' for Undocumented Immigrants, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article119467653.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
113. Infra Part IV.A.
114. Infra Part IV.B.
115. Infra Part IV.C.
116. Infra Part IV.D.
117. Infra Part IV.E.
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A. Will Chapter 495 Actually Protect the Safety of All Californians By Building
Trust in the Community?
California legislators hotly debate whether Chapter 495 will actually promote
public safety—a key element of the potential success or failure of this new
law.118 Subsection 1 discusses whether Chapter 495 protects only immigrants or
if it protects all those living in California.119 Subsection 2 explains how Chapter
495’s success depends on whether legislation can actually rebuild trust between
law enforcement and immigrants considering the multitude of other historical,
social, and political factors that contribute to this mistrust.120 Finally, Subsection
3 explores the notion that Chapter 495’s ability to promote public safety also
depends on whether an increased ICE presence on the streets, rather than in
prisons, will actually have the opposite effect than intended.121
1. Will it Promote the Safety of All Californians or Just a Few?
Chapter 495’s supporters argue that entangling local law enforcement with
the “dirty business of deportations” threatens the safety of all Californians
because it deteriorates the relationship of trust between law enforcement and
immigrant communities.122 When immigrants hear about neighbors or loved ones
who call the police to report a crime and end up being deported, this undoubtedly
diminishes their trust in law enforcement.123 Because of this entanglement,
“immigrant community members fear approaching police when they are victims
of, and witnesses to, crimes, seeking basic health services, or attending school”
out of concern they will be taken into custody or even deported.124 In a 2013
University of Illinois study, researchers found “70 percent of undocumented
immigrants reported they are less likely to contact law enforcement if they were
victims of a crime.”125

118. See SENATE FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 13 (Mar. 17, 2017) (summarizing arguments
opposing the California Values Act).
119. Infra Part IV.A.1.
120. Infra Part IV.A.2.
121. Infra Part IV.A.3.
122. SENATE FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 12 (Mar. 17, 2017).
123. See Thomas Kennedy, Despite Promises, Florida Police Are Acting Like Immigration Agents and
Separating Families, HUFFINGTON POST (July 6, 2017) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/despite-promisesflorida-police-are-acting-like-immigration_us_595e8ebae4b0cf3c8e8d572d (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing the fear of being detained or deported after a traffic stop).
124. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2(f) (enacted by Chapter 495); Al-Khatib, supra note 13, at 157–158.
125. NIK THEODORE, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT i (May 2013), available at https://www.policylink.org/sites/
default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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This is a very real problem in immigrant communities.126 Even so, while the
effects of this mistrust are felt primarily by immigrants, mistrust threatens the
health and safety of a much wider population.127 This population includes legal
and illegal immigrants as well as non-immigrants, albeit to a more limited
extent.128 Both of these groups are impacted because “millions are affected when
law enforcement officers, who may be untrained in immigration law, stop and
question Latinos and other Americans who ‘look’ or ‘sound’ like they might be
foreign.”129 This profiling erodes trust within communities because it spreads
both racial bias and discrimination throughout those communities.130 In this
sense, Chapter 495 could positively affect the health and safety of all
Californians by helping counteract the discrimination and racial bias that results
from untrained law enforcement trying to perform the complex task of
immigration enforcement.131
For some segments of the general population, community mistrust of law
enforcement is simply not an issue, and whether other communities—namely
those of immigrants—are mistrustful of police does not impact them.132 Because
neither racial bias nor discrimination impacts these segments’ health or safety,
the extent to which Chapter 495 is even capable of promoting the health and
safety of all Californians is limited.133 Therefore, while the effects of Chapter 495
will likely reverberate, to an extent, through all segments of California’s
population, it will primarily impact immigrant communities because they are the
ones who fear reporting crimes and are more likely to experience the effects of
profiling.134

126. Al-Khatib, supra note 13, at 157.
127. Id. at 157–58; Michele Waslin, Immigration Enforcement by State and Local Police: The Impact on
the Enforcers and Their Communities, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S.
CITIES AND STATES 97, 106 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010).
128. Hing, supra note 60, at 307 (“Sanctuary policies . . . promote public safety for everyone.”).
129. Waslin, supra note 127, at 106.
130. Id.
131. Hing, supra note 60, at 307.
132. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive
Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 43–44 (2011) (“‘[T]he perception in many poor and
minority communities is that the law, as exemplified by the police, is illegitimate, a perception that encourages
non-compliance.’ It follows that areas in need of the greatest amount of law enforcement protection are also
likely to have a large proportion of residents who distrust law enforcement.”).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 41 (explaining the problem in Latino communities by noting that “[o]fficers create an
environment where Latinos are ‘cast as foreigners,’ and those of the working class in emerging Latino
communities are questioned more often since they might bear a resemblance to the ‘stereotypical image of what
illegal immigrants supposedly look like.’”).
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2. Can Legislation Rebuild the Trust Between Immigrants and Law
Enforcement, and Is Chapter 495, On Its Own, Equipped to Do That?
To a certain extent, Chapter 495 overlooks the possibility that disentangling
police from immigration enforcement might not have any impact on these trust
issues.135 While police involvement in immigration may factor into the mistrust,
there are undoubtedly other factors that cause this fear.136 These may include, for
example, the current administration’s pledges to crack down on immigration that
have saturated the media in recent months and racial bias and hate crimes that
have permeated American culture for centuries.137 The International Association
of Chiefs of Police pointed out another, often overlooked, factor that contributes
to this mistrust:
[T]he majority now entering [the U.S.] are from developing countries,
where the image of law enforcement is drastically different than within
the United States. Often the police in some of these countries are
perceived as violent, corrupt and ineffective. These perceptions are often
transferred to the immigrants’ perception of the American police as
well.138
Their report further noted that language barriers stand as “the strongest
obstacle in building cohesive relationships with the immigrant community.”139
Taken together, these factors suggest that rebuilding trust is a nuanced process.140
Ultimately, while it will be difficult to rebuild the trust between immigrants and
135. Joel Rose, In A ‘Sanctuary City,’ Immigrant Residents Still Fear Police, NPR ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/12/519925246/in-a-sanctuary-city-immigrantresidents-still-fear-police (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the fact that even
in sanctuary cities which have “disentangled” this relationship, immigrants’ fear of law enforcement persists).
136. See Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of Reporting Crimes,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/23/undocumented-immigrantswary-report-crimes-deportation (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the
“chilling effect” resulting from ICE’s recent “aggressive tactics”); see also Vivian Yee, Immigrants Hide,
Fearing Capture on ‘Any Corner’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/22/us/immigrants-deportation-fears.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(discussing the reality that “with the Trump administration intent on curbing illegal immigration . . . that threat,
for many people, has now begun to distort every movement”).
137. Dart, supra note 136; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 33; Jessica Weiss, ‘Go Back to Your
Country’: Immigrants Report a Wave of Insults and Slurs, UNIVISION (Feb. 22, 2017)
http://www.univision.com/univision-news/united-states/go-back-to-your-country-immigrants-report-a-wave-ofinsults-and-slurs (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on the wave of antiimmigrant hate crimes and bias incidents since the recent election).
138. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION ISSUES 21 (2007),
available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
139. Id.
140. Rose, supra note 135.
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law enforcement because of the many factors affecting this relationship, it is still
possible.141
Chapter 495 has the potential to make progress toward rebuilding trust
between immigrants and law enforcement, as some reports suggest that sanctuary
policies may have a direct impact on public health and safety via lower crime
rates.142 For example, one study suggested that there are “33.5 fewer crimes
committed per 10,000 people in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary
counties.”143 While this report is not determinative of the correlation between
crime rates and sanctuary states, it supports the idea that disentangling LEAs
from immigration enforcement results in safer communities, which may
encourage immigrants to alter their perception of LEAs in sanctuary
jurisdictions.144 That said, after many years of police and ICE entanglement, and
in the midst of Trump’s “immigration crackdown,” it is doubtful that one piece of
California legislation can rebuild this trust on its own.145 Ultimately, although
Chapter 495 takes a step in the right direction, it is likely not quite enough, on its
own, to achieve its goal.146
3. Will Chapter 495 Build Trust or Endanger Immigrant Communities by
Pushing ICE onto the Streets?
Warning of the dangerous unintended consequences of the new law, critics of
Chapter 495 believe that the measure will actually threaten the safety of local
communities and “create more fear . . . by forcing federal immigration operations
out of . . . jails and into . . . communities.”147 The root of these concerns are
141. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 138, at 21 (highlighting the importance of
rebuilding this trust by proposing strategies for law enforcement like daily contact and outreach programs).
142. Gene Demby, Why Sanctuary Cities Are Safer, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2017/01/29/512002076/why-sanctuary-cities-are-safer (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
143. Tom Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297 366/the-effectsof-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). This
study compared “all sanctuary counties to all nonsanctuary counties … across a range of social and economic
indicators.” Id. Sanctuary counties are those that ICE had previously identified “as not willing to accept
detainers.” Id. The crime data for each of these counties was pulled from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting
Program. Id. The study also used coarsened exact matching, or CEM, which “statistically matches sanctuary
counties to comparable nonsanctuary counties.” Id.
144. Id.; Demby, supra note 142.
145. Daniel Denvir, The False Promise of Sanctuary Cities, SLATE (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/02/the_false_promise_of_sanctuary_cities.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Rose, supra note 135 (reporting that even in jurisdictions with
sanctuary policies in place, fear of law enforcement among immigrants persists).
146. Denvir, supra note 145.
146. Rose, supra note 135.
147. Letter from California Police Chiefs Association to Kevin de Leon, Senate President pro Tempore,
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Chapter 495’s extensive limitations on an LEA’s ability to use money and
personnel for immigration enforcement purposes, such as detaining a person on
the basis of an ICE hold request or providing release dates to ICE; uses which it
was previously permitted to devote resources to.148 Ultimately, while Chapter 495
will likely hurt immigrant communities by leading to more collateral arrests and
frequent ICE raids, that harm will be limited by the lack of available federal
resources necessary to conduct those raids.149
If Chapter 495 forces ICE to pursue these individuals themselves by going
into communities rather than relying on LEAs to cooperate regarding individuals
already in custody, the amount of collateral arrests will probably increase.150 A
collateral arrest may occur, for example, when ICE detains an “undocumented
individual at the scene of an arrest.”151 The primary concern here is ICE’s
heightened presence on the street will further reduce the already low trust
immigrants have in law enforcement and cause innumerable problems in local
communities.152
With more ICE agents on the streets, an increasing number of raids are
inevitable.153 As one journalist reports, “In anticipation of [ICE] crackdowns,
people say they have stopped driving, stopped shopping, stopped sending
remittances to countries of origin.”154 In other sanctuary jurisdictions, increasing
“operational activity” is “one of the ways ICE is turning up . . . the heat on local
authorities and part of a broader strategy to coerce cooperation.”155 The fear of an
ICE raid, where agents storm into your home and take loved ones away, may in
reality be even greater than the fear that accompanies seeing a police officer on
the street.156 The chances that an ICE agent will target a person never convicted
of a crime will also rise because it will be more difficult for ICE to obtain

Cal. State Senate (June 6, 2017), http://www.californiapolicechiefs.org/assets/SB%2054%20Oppose%206.6.pdf
[hereinafter California Police Chiefs Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
148. Id.
149. Alejandro Molina & Brenda Gazzar, How California’s ‘Sanctuary State’ Bill Would Further Limit
ICE’s Ability to Arrest Immigrants, L.A. DAILY NEWS (July 21, 2017), http://www.dailynews.com/generalnews/20170721/how-californias-sanctuary-state-bill-would-further-limit-ices-ability-to-arrest-immigrants (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Waslin, supra note 127, at 111.
150. California Police Chiefs Letter, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Delphine Schrank, Trump’s Season of Fear: Inside the Devastation Left by Immigration Raids,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/13/undocumented-immigrationraids-ice-impact (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
155. Maria Santana, ICE is Targeting ‘Sanctuary Cities’ with Raids, CNN (Mar. 25, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/23/politics/sanctuary-city-ice-raids/index.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
156. Schrank, supra note 154.
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custody of those already in local prisons and jails.157 This injects an element of
uneasiness into immigrant communities and, on a macro level, does not
necessarily protect the health and safety of these individuals.158
Even so, federal resources will undoubtedly limit this potentially detrimental
impact.159 The primary reason federal authorities involved state and local law
enforcement in the first place was that they needed resources, manpower, and
close ties to the situation on the ground, which they themselves lacked.160
Disentangling LEAs from federal immigration agencies will shift a significant
financial burden onto ICE.161 As the sanctuary movement spreads throughout the
United States, it will stretch federal resources very thin.162 An exponential
increase in ICE raids is likely not a sustainable practice; therefore, the extent to
which ICE can actually perform its duties without the resources of state and local
LEAs would limit the risks associated with Chapter 495.163
B. Is Chapter 495 a Solution in Search of a Problem, and Will It Actually
Promote Public Safety by Safeguarding the State’s Limited Resources?
Chapter 495 aims to increase public safety by allowing local law
enforcement to spend their time, energy, and resources protecting everyone in the
community (including immigrants) rather than helping enforce federal
immigration laws at their own expense.164 The underlying assumption of Chapter
495 is that LEAs use resources for immigration purposes.165 The reality is that

157. See Jennifer Medina & Miriam Jordan, A Broader Sweep, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/21/us/immigration-enforcement-california-trump.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on the prevalence of collateral, “unplanned” arrests
that often unfold during ICE raids).
158. Schrank, supra note 154.
159. Henry Grabar, Not in Our Town, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/cover_story/2016/11/how_cities_could_thwart_donald_trump_s_deportation_plan.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“ICE is the largest investigative agency in DHS . . . [b]ut
its numbers are tiny compared with the nation’s full-time law enforcement officers.”).
160. Armacost, supra note 10, at 1205.
161. Alex Kotlowitz, The Limits of Sanctuary Cities, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-sanctuary-cities (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
162. Id. (“[W]ithout the cooperation of local law enforcement, finding immigrants would be a difficult
task”).
163. Id.
164. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 7 (June 12, 2017).
165. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.2 (enacted by Chapter 495) (listing the need to shift or redirect
California’s resources to matters of “greatest concern to state and local governments”); see also Press Release,
Kevin De León, Cal. State Senate, The State of California Will Be Your Wall of Justice (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/print/news/2016-12-07-senate-leader-de-le%C3%B3n-introduces-bill%E2%80%9Cfreeze-out-ice%E2%80%9D [hereinafter December 7, 2016 Press Release] (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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California already has many sanctuary policies in place that do significantly
similar things as Chapter 495.166 Still, Chapter 495 is unique because it expands
on and unifies these piecemeal local sanctuary policies into one state-wide
regulation, making the entire state of California a “sanctuary state.”167 Currently,
Orange County is the only California county that has an active 287(g) agreement
with ICE.168 Further, “none of the sheriffs in California’s 58 counties [are]
willing to [honor ICE immigration holds by] hold[ing] inmates past their release
dates.”169 This is largely due to a 2014 federal court decision wherein the court
found a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when officers held a woman “in
jail for close to 20 hours after her case . . . settled so that ICE could ascertain her
immigration status.”170 Recent statewide legislation, like the TRUST Act,
demonstrates California’s shift away from the collaborative approach taken by
the federal government.171
On the other hand, however, although statewide sanctuary policies already
exist, it is difficult to say that Chapter 495 is a solution without a problem.172
After all, there are still jurisdictions that actively collaborate with ICE in varying
capacities.173 Stanislaus County, for instance, gives ICE agents “unfettered
access” to jails, “where they interview inmates and scroll through computer
databases.”174 Therefore, even though California has recently taken strides
toward disentangling local and state LEAs from immigration enforcement,
various cooperation tactics evidence that those efforts have been insufficient to
address the issue.175 In that sense, Chapter 495 is not a solution in search of a
problem because it directs its focus toward the very real problem of local and
state LEA involvement with ICE.176
Chapter 495 will promote public safety by limiting state spending in this area
because it will better equip our law enforcement and provide them with more
resources on hand to protect communities from violent criminals.177 State and
166. Joel Rubin & Paloma Esquivel, For Some California Sheriffs, It’s Not Politics Stopping Them From
Fully Helping ICE: It’s the Legal Risk, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meice-detainers-sheriffs-20170330-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
167. Ulloa, supra note 45.
168. Fact Sheet for 287(g) Program, supra note 40.
169. Rubin & Esquivel, supra note 166.
170. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1, *11 (D.
Or., Apr. 11, 2014); Molina & Gazzar, supra note 149.
171. Criminal Justice and Immigration Enforcement, supra note 56, at 2594–95.
172. Rubin & Esquivel, supra note 166.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Press Release, Kevin De León, Cal. State Senate, California Values Act Heads to Appropriations,
Assembly Member Cooper Joins as Principal Co-Author (Mar. 10, 2017), http://sd24.senate.
ca.gov/print/news/2017-03-10-california-values-act-heads-appropriations-assemblymember-cooper-joins-
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local LEA involvement in federal immigration enforcement is expensive.178 ICE
does not cover the cost of enforcing its immigration detainers; instead, those
costs go to the state or local agency that chooses to help ICE by enforcing its
detainers.179 Chapter 495 also helps limit immigration law’s complex legal
implications.180 When LEAs enforce immigration laws, they run the risk of being
subject to “civil liability . . . for improper enforcement.”181 The disentanglement
required by Chapter 495 would allow LEAs to better manage their risks and
eliminate legal costs.182
C. Is Chapter 495 Preempted by Federal Law?
Those opposed to sanctuary policies argue that federal law preempts them.183
The preemption doctrine prevents states from regulating in a field that is under
the control of the federal government.184 Existing federal law prohibits state or
local government entities, agencies, officials, and persons from restricting their
employees’ ability to voluntarily report information regarding a person’s
immigration status to federal immigration authorities.185 Chapter 495 may face
preemption challenges based on this federal restriction.186 On a practical level, if
a court finds Chapter 495 conflicts with federal law and is preempted, then
Chapter 495 must yield to the federal law, meaning a court may invalidate it.187
Subsection 1 discusses whether the characterization of Chapter 495 as either
a don’t-ask or a don’t-tell policy influences the preemption analysis.188

principal-co [hereinafter March 10, 2017 Press Release] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
178. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 7 (June 12, 2017)
(reporting that “when the Secure Communities program was still active, California taxpayers spent an estimated
$65 million annually to detain people for ICE.”).
179. Al-Khatib, supra note 13, at 161–62; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(e) (2011) (“No detainer issued as a
result of a determination made under this chapter . . . shall incur any fiscal obligation on the part of the
Department, until actual assumption of custody by the Department” except where an LEA has agreed to
temporarily detain an individual at the department’s request.).
180. Waslin, supra note 127, at 104.
181. Papazian, supra note 16, at 287–92.
182. Waslin, supra note 127, at 104 (litigation costs); March 10, 2017 Press Release, supra note 177.
183. Jennifer L. Gregorin, Hidden Beneath the Waves of Immigration Debate: San Francisco’s Sanctuary
Ordinance, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 175, 189 (2011).
184. Al-Khatib, supra note 13, at 140.
185. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 115–43); Id. § 1644 (West, Westlaw through P.L.
115–43).
186. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration
Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1691 (2009) (discussing whether San Francisco’s
sanctuary policy might be preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1373); see also Hing, supra note 60, at 278 (discussing
whether §§ 1644 and 1373 may preempt sanctuary policies).
187. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); Hing, supra note 60, at 281.
188. Infra Part IV.D.1.
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Subsection 2 describes the challenges posed by express preemption.189
Subsection 3 explores whether federal law preempts Chapter 495 under a field
preemption theory.190 Subsection 4 explores the applicability of conflict
preemption.191 Subsection 5 details the important role of the state’s police power
in protecting state legislation like Chapter 495 under the Tenth Amendment.192
1. Is Chapter 495 a Don’t Ask or a Don’t Tell Policy, and Does It Matter?
While there is no bright-line rule for determining whether the preemption
doctrine will invalidate a state or local law, the extent to which legislators will
characterize Chapter 495 as a don’t-ask as opposed to a don’t-tell policy matters,
and will be critical to its ability to survive a preemption challenge.193 City of New
York and Sturgeon demonstrate the diverging outcomes that may unfold
depending on whether the state construes a policy as don’t-ask or don’t-tell.194 It
is important to note that “the federal government has yet to proactively challenge
a single don’t tell sanctuary law.”195 In City of New York, the city initiated
litigation, not the federal government.196 This is instructive insofar as it suggests
the federal government is unlikely to institute a legal challenge against such
policies.197
While people may construe it either way, Chapter 495’s language aligns
more closely with a don’t-ask approach than don’t-tell because it does not
explicitly prevent communication to ICE regarding a person’s immigration
status, nor does it prevent using resources to that end.198 In City of New York, the
local policy at issue did just that.199 That said, one could argue that by limiting
the extent to which LEAs can use their resources to help with immigration
enforcement in other ways (like revealing release dates or home addresses), they
are, in effect, operating under a don’t-tell policy.200 On the other hand, that line of
reasoning ignores what a don’t-tell policy is meant to do: prohibit government
employees from disclosing or communicating an individual’s immigration
189. Infra Part IV.D.2.
190. Infra Part IV.D.3.
191. Infra Part IV.D.4.
192. Infra Part IV.D.5.
193. Hing, supra note 60, at 280; Papazian, supra note 16, at 295.
194. Papazian, supra note 16, at 295.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(f) (enacted by Chapter 495); Id. § 7284.6(a)(1).
199. City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
200. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(1)(C)–(E) (enacted by Chapter 495) (preventing local and state
LEAs from using resources to communicate the release date or personal information, such as home addresses, to
federal immigration enforcement agencies).

504

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49
information to the federal government.201 Therefore, we cannot easily construe
Chapter 495 as a don’t-tell policy because it does not prevent information sharing
regarding a person’s immigration status.202
Chapter 495 does, however, contain an explicit don’t-ask provision that
forbids state and local LEAs from using resources to inquire into an individual’s
immigration status.203 Therefore, based on the diverging outcomes between City
of New York and Sturgeon, and because Chapter 495 most closely aligns with a
don’t-ask policy, Chapter 495 is less vulnerable to a preemption challenge.204
That said, it is not immune from the possibility of preemption because it concerns
a federal matter (immigration).205
2. Express Preemption
Express preemption “requires a clear statement from Congress of its intent to
preempt a particular sort of state law.”206 When looking at the plain language of
both 8 U.S.C. §§ 1644 and 1373, neither appear to contain any language
indicating an intention to preempt state or local laws that limit the use of
resources for communications with federal immigration agencies.207 On the other
hand, section 1373 does include the language “notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State or local law,” which may suggest that Congress
intended to preempt any state or local laws.208 The scope of that clause is crucial
in assessing whether it expressly preempts Chapter 495.209
Because the plain language of Chapter 495 does not explicitly forbid
communication of an individual’s immigration status, it is not necessarily an
obvious express preemption target.210 Chapter 495 prevents using state resources
to communicate release dates and personal information, such as a home or work
address.211 It also does not limit an LEAs ability to relay an individual’s criminal
history, nor does it restrict the ability to report a person’s immigration status to
federal agencies.212
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206.
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208.
209.
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212.

Papazian, supra note 16, at 291–292.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(f) (enacted by Chapter 495).
Id. § 7284.6(a)(1)(A).
Papazian, supra note 16, at 295.
Id.
Rodríguez, supra note 73, at 31, 34.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1644 (West 2017); Id. § 1373.
Id. § 1373(b), (d); Gulasekaram, supra note 186, at 1700.
Pham, supra note 77, at 1392.
Id. at 1393.
CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 7284.6(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 495).
Id. § 7284.6(f); Id. § 7284.6(b)(1).
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On the other hand, Chapter 495 does contain a don’t-ask provision that
prevents LEAs from using resources to inquire into an individual’s immigration
status.213 If courts interpret a state law that prohibits “local government
employees from inquiring about citizenship . . . as restricting their ability to
cooperate with federal immigration authorities” based on the idea that it bars
state and local LEAs “from obtaining the information that makes their
cooperation possible,” then federal law could preempt Chapter 495 on that
ground.214 A narrow reading may stretch the plain language of the federal law too
far.215 Therefore, the lack of clarity relating to Congress’ intent on this issue,
coupled with “the starting assumption . . . that a local law is valid unless it is ‘the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ to preempt it,” suggests that preemption
is unlikely on this basis.216
3. Field Preemption
When Congress determines it exclusively governs a field, states may not
regulate conduct in that field.217 As previously noted, the federal government has
traditionally exercised exclusive authority over immigration law.218 Despite this,
however, state and local actors have undoubtedly played a key role in the
enforcement of immigration law.219 The law even permits them to perform the
same functions as an immigration officer in limited circumstances.220 Therefore,
while the federal government stands at the frontline of immigration enforcement,
it is not alone.221 Enforcing immigration laws on the ground, however, is
different from regulation.222 While enforcing immigration laws involves LEAs to
a certain extent, they are not authorized to pass laws regulating the flow of
people into and out of the United States.223 The federal government may consider
213. Id. § 7284.6(a)(1)(A).
214. Pham, supra note 77, at 1393.
215. Hing, supra note 60, at 281 (“Congressional intent must be clear to find preemption because of a
desire, stemming from federalism concerns, to minimize invalidation of state and local laws.”).
216. Pham, supra note 77, at 1392; see also Rodríguez, supra note 73, at 34 (explaining the need for a
clear expression of Congressional intent to find preemption).
217. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
218. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
219. Armacost, supra note 10, at 1206.
220. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 408; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g) (West 2006) (establishing the
287(g) program, which authorizes the Attorney General to enter into formal agreements with state or local
governments to allow police officers to perform the functions of immigration officers).
221. Armacost, supra note 10, at 1206.
222. Kim, supra note 77, at 246 (“[E]stablishing the regulatory regime for the entry and removal of aliens
is exclusively a federal power . . . [h]owever, enforcement of the federal immigration law need not be a solely
federal activity.”).
223. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right
to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress.”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The
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this delegation of power to the states as simply permitting limited state
participation in the federal system rather than authorizing states to exercise
independent authority in that field without any role for the federal government.224
In that sense, the federal government certainly has a strong argument that it
exclusively governs the field of immigration law and that federal laws should
preempt all state laws trying to regulate immigration.225
On the other hand, however, there is a real question about whether Chapter
495 regulates immigration or merely sets limits on how state resources should be
spent.226 As the Supreme Court pointed out in De Canas, immigration regulation
is “essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”227 From the
plain language of Chapter 495, it certainly does not regulate immigration, as the
Supreme Court defines the term.228 Instead, it appears to serve important state
and local interests: public safety and allocating public resources.229 The new law
will do that by indirectly protecting immigrant communities from crime within
the United States—not by regulating whether they may remain in the country.230
Further, the Supreme Court has expressed distaste for federal attempts to dictate
how states spend their money and manage police force priorities.231 Therefore, if
we accept that sanctuary policies like Chapter 495 are indeed “about public
safety and represent economic decisions on how to spend policing resources and
are not about regulating immigrants,” they appear to escape the clutches of
preemption.232
4. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption exists where it is impossible to comply with both federal
and state laws, and where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

authority to control immigration – to admit or exclude aliens – is vested solely in the Federal Government.”).
224. Kim, supra note 77, at 251, 254.
225. Id.
226. Lilia Luciano, Is a ‘Sanctuary State’ Constitutional?, KXTV (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.abc10.com/
news/investigations/is-a-sanctuary-state-constitutional/429430584 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
227. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
228. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 9 (June 12,
2017) (emphasizing that “this bill seeks to place limits on the use of law enforcement resources to investigate or
detain persons for federal immigration enforcement purposes,” and says nothing about the bill’s intent on
regulating the flow of people in and out of the state or country).
229. SB 54, 2017 Leg., 2016–2017 Sess., § 1.
230. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 54, at 9 (June 12, 2017).
231. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 186, at 1702.
232. Hing, supra note 60, at 290.
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Congress.”233 Chapter 495’s plain language suggests it is possible to comply with
both federal and state laws.234 This is because while Chapter 495 does limit an
LEA’s ability to use state and local resources to collaborate with ICE, it does not
limit an LEA’s ability to voluntarily communicate regarding an individual’s
immigration status.235 Instead, it prevents LEAs from using state resources to ask
a person about their immigration status, honor ICE hold requests, provide
information relating to release dates and personal data that is not publicly
available, and enter into 287(g) agreements.236 Because these restrictions do not
apply to communications with ICE regarding a person’s immigration status,
Chapter 495 does not appear to conflict with the requirements set forth in
sections 1644 and 1373.237
That said, the question of whether Chapter 495 impedes a federal objective
carries with it a significant degree of subjectivity and discretion.238 Courts may
narrowly construe federal objectives to avoid preemption by interpreting the
“state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose.”239
Alternatively, courts could broadly define the federal objective, resulting in
preemption of a wider range of state laws.240 This discretion will be left to the
court if a party brings a preemption challenge.241
5. Generally, Federal Law Should Not Supersede State Police Powers
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court reiterated that federal law
should not supersede the “historic police powers of the States” absent a clear,
contrary intention of Congress.242 The stated focal points of sanctuary policies
like Chapter 495 are public safety and prioritizing the allocation of public funds
and resources.243 Sanctuary policies are not about regulating immigration.244 If
federal law preempts sanctuary policies like Chapter 495, “local governments
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could experience substantial harm to their public safety police power.”245
Preemption of sanctuary policies could threaten public safety because without
such policies, “immigrants, already vulnerable to extortion and organized crime,
may refuse to report crimes or participate in criminal investigations for fear of
the immigration consequences.”246 Therefore, because of the strength of this
police power defense to preemption challenges and because judicial precedent
recognizes that police powers belong to the states, California has a strong
argument that Chapter 495 is not preempted.247 In its entirety, legislators framed
Chapter 495 in such a way that it may avoid preemption problems due to its
careful wording and reiterated purposes of public safety and prioritizing
resources.248
D. Is Chapter 495 Merely an Exercise of State Sovereignty Under the Tenth
Amendment?
On the other side of the preemption argument are those who contend that
sanctuary policies are merely an exercise of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment.249 Along this thread, local policing, public safety, and the health of
Californians are matters that should be left to the state and not to the federal
government.250 The anti-commandeering doctrine is the root of these concerns
and provides that it is unconstitutional for a federal law to intrude into an area of
state sovereignty (and vice versa).251 As interpreted by jurisprudence, it prohibits
the federal government from forcing states or localities to regulate a specific
issue.252 As one scholar points out, “If the irreducible sovereignty of states . . .
means anything, it must at least mean that states . . . can decide how to distribute
their revenues.”253 This argument rests on the (correct) assumption that Chapter
495 is about public safety, local policing, and the health of Californians and not
about regulating immigration.254
In a letter sent in support of Chapter 495, over 100 law professors across the
country agreed that “there is ‘no better example of the police power . . . than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.’ Policing is squarely
245. Pham, supra note 77, at 1399.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1398–99.
248. Hing, supra note 60, at 296.
249. Gregorin, supra note 183, at 189.
250. Cimini, supra note 79, at 139.
251. Hing, supra note 60, at 273.
252. Cimini, supra note 79, at 141; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program.”).
253. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 186, at 1701–02.
254. Id.
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within a State’s ‘proper sphere of authority,’ and the California Values Act
‘seeks to ensure effective policing’ and ‘protect the safety’ of Californians.”255
Chapter 495 does not regulate immigrants or the rights of non-citizens.256 Instead,
legislators crafted it in a way that focuses on a desire to have control over how
states expend state and local resources, to protect the public (which includes
immigrants) by building trust, and to encourage law enforcement to focus on
making their communities safer.257 Because of this focus, concerns revolving
around anti-commandeering are proper.258
The complaint filed in City and County of San Francisco v. Donald Trump
emphasized that sanctuary policies are simply an exercise of state sovereignty to
develop policies to protect their communities and ensure the safety and wellbeing of all.259 In Judge Orrick’s decision, he noted that it was a blatant violation
of the prohibition against commandeering established by the Tenth Amendment
for the federal government to pull grants from jurisdictions simply because they
do not adopt and honor voluntary federal programs.260 This decision certainly
bolsters the idea that sanctuary policies like Chapter 495 are merely an exercise
of state sovereignty and, therefore, the federal government should respect
them.261 As evidenced by Chapter 495’s creation of immigrant safe zones, the
law primarily “seek[s] to ensure that immigrant community members can avail
themselves of public services and schools without fear.”262 This purpose aligns
neatly with the general police powers that both the Supreme Court and the
Constitution have recognized belong to the states.263
E. What is the Fiscal Impact of Chapter 495, and What Does California’s
Wallet Have to Lose?
Many are concerned that Chapter 495 will result in the loss of significant
amounts of federal funding.264 President Trump exacerbated this concern with
Executive Order 13768, wherein he pledged to rescind federal funding for

255. Letter from Christopher Lasch et al., to Kevin de Leon, Senate President pro Tempore, Cal. State
Senate 3 (May 17, 2017) [hereinafter Letter from Law Professors] (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 186, at 1701–02.
259. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, City and County of San Francisco v. Donald
Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017).
260. County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081, at *4, *24
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (order granting preliminary injunction).
261. Id.
262. Letter from Law Professors, supra note 255.
263. John Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 140, 150 (1855).
264. Ulloa, supra note 45.
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sanctuary jurisdictions across the country.265 In response to this order, a federal
district court judge issued a nationwide injunction to prevent this pledge.266 The
recent injunction has largely put to rest any immediate concerns over federal
funding cuts that would inevitably reach California in the wake of Chapter
495.267 That said, if the administration can find a way to bring these threats to
fruition, Chapter 495 places a huge target on California’s back.268 Nationally, it
could result in a loss of $870 million this year in sanctuary cities throughout 32
states if the federal government is permitted to enforce the order.269 California
expects to receive $105 billion from the federal government next year.270 This is
about one-third of the state’s entire budget.271 Even if a court lifts the injunction
and enforcement of the order proceeds, it remains unclear precisely what type of
federal funding the executive order would withhold from California.272 The most
likely scenario would be that it withholds “federal funds related to immigration
enforcement,” which ultimately is a relatively small amount and accounts for
roughly one five-thousandth of the overall state budget.273
V. CONCLUSION
For decades, disagreements over immigration enforcement have permeated
nearly every level and branch of government.274 A tidal wave of federal, state,
and local legislation and policies that appear to regulate immigration has revealed
a deep, foundational divide among the American people and attracted the
attention of millions.275 This conflict is symptomatic of a “clash of sovereignties
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in which the relationship between noncitizens and subnational government
depends upon the survival or demise of the age-old rule of exclusive federal
control of immigration.”276 Chapter 495 represents California’s attempt to revive
the separation between the proper roles of state and federal actors in enforcing
immigration laws and ensure that state resources “are not used to fuel the mass
deportations” that the current Administration pledges to pursue.277
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